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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because of
the untimely filing of appellant's notice of appeal.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Standard of Appellate Review
Since this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this appeal,
there is no need to apply any standard of review.

Should this

Court decide, however, that it has jurisdiction, the standard of
review

is

as

follows:

This

appeal

from

a

summary

judgment

presents only questions of law and this Court reviews the lower
court's

ruling

for

correctness

and

accords

no

particular

deference to the conclusions reached by the trial court.

Madsen

v. United Television, Inc., 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 3 (Utah 1990).
Issues
1.

Does this Court lack jurisdiction over this appeal due

to the untimely filing of appellant's notices of appeal?
2.

Was

the

district

defendants/appellants

Utah

court

State

Bar

correct
(Bar)

in
and

ruling
Sydnie

that
Kuhre

(Kuhre) (collectively defendants) are not subject to the Archives
and

Records

Neerings

has

Services
no cause

and
of

Information
action

alleged violation of the Act?

2

Practices

Act

against defendants

and

that

for their

3.

If the Act is construed to apply to defendants, does it

violate Article V of the Constitution of Utah?
4.

Was the district court correct in ruling that there is

no right of privacy created by the Constitution of Utah?

If

there is such a right, was it violated in this case?
5.

Was the district court correct

in ruling that the

internal policies and procedures of the Bar do not create a right
of privacy in favor of Neerings?
6.

Was the district court correct in ruling that Neerings

failed to establish all necessary elements of a common law cause
of action for invasion of privacy?
III.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The provisions of Utah Code Ann. sections 63-2-59 through
63-2-89 (1953 as amended) , a copy of which is included in the
addendum, are determinative of the issues relating to Neerings1
first cause of action.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an action involving four causes of action seeking
declaratory
damages,

and injunctive relief, compensatory

and

attorney's

fees

based

on

and exemplary

defendants1

alleged

unauthorized disclosure to members of the public of the results
3

of Neerings1 bar examination and the results of his appeal of the
examination results.
Course of Proceedings
Defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment as to all

four of Neerings1 causes of action.

That motion was granted by

the lower court.
Disposition in the Court Below
The

Third

Judicial

District

Court

in

and

for

Salt

Lake

County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding,
granted defendants1 motion for summary judgment.
Statement of Facts
1.

February 25-27, 1988 —

examination

(Record

Neerings took the Utah State Bar

(hereafter " R . " ) ,

p. 80 at para. 8; R. , p.

387, Deposition of R. Owen Neerings (hereafter "Neerings depo."),
p. 14) .
2.

March 25, 1988 —

Neerings telephoned the bar office and

was informed that he failed the bar examination

(R. , p. 81 at

para. 11; Neerings depo., p. 14).
3.
being

Neerings
informed

that

disclosed Neerings1
Fasselin

alleges
he

that approximately
failed

the

bar

one week

examination,

before
Kuhre

bar examination results to her friend, Jan

(Fasselin), Neerings1 co-worker at the Regency Theater

(R., p. 81 at para. 12; Neerings depo., pp. 17 and 24).
4

Although

defendants dispute that such disclosure was made, they

accept

Neerings' allegation as true for purposes of this appeal.
4.

Neerings subsequently appealed the results of his bar

examination to the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar.
A hearing was held with respect to that appeal on or about May
17, 1988,
decision

On May 18, 1988, the Board of Commissioners issued a
denying

Neerings1

appeal.

Neerings

learned

on

the

afternoon of May 25, 1988 that the appeal had been denied (R., p.
81 at paras. 13 and 14; Neerings depo., pp. 44 and 45).
5.

Neerings

alleges

that approximately

one week

before

being informed of the results of the appeal, Kuhre disclosed the
results to Fasselin

(R. , pp. 81 and 82 at para. 15; Neerings

depo., pp. 44 and 45).

Although defendants dispute that such

disclosure was ever made, they accept Neerings1

allegation

as

true for purposes of this appeal.
6.

January 12, 1989 —

By minute entry, the district court

ruled that defendants' motion

for summary

judgment be granted

(R., p. 204).
7.

January 20, 1989 —

Neerings filed "Motion/Request for

Findings11 in the district court requesting the court, pursuant to
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to issue a brief
written

statement

of

the

grounds

for

its

decision

granding

defendants1 motion for summary judgment (R., pp. 205 and 206).
5

8.

February 1, 1989 —

Neerings filed in the district court

a motion for a new trial and to amend judgment pursuant to Rule
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R., pp. 210 and 211).
9.

February 6, 1989 —

The district court entered summary

judgment in favor of defendants (R., pp. 213 and 214).
10.

March 9, 1989 —

Neerings filed a notice of appeal in

the district court (R., p. 240).
11.

March 15, 1989 —

The district court entered an order

denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial and to amend judgment
(R., pp. 243 and 244).
11.

November 1, 1989 —

The district court entered an order

disposing of Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings11 (R. , pp. 376
and 377).
12.

November 16, 1989 -- Neerings filed a notice of appeal

in the district court (R., p. 384). 1

1

This was the fourth notice of appeal filed by Neerings.
The first, filed March 9, 1989, was filed 31 days after entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendants and six days before entry
of the order denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial and to
amend judgment.
The second notice of appeal was filed June 6,
1989 (R. , p. 256), 120 days after entry of summary judgment in
favor of defendants and 83 days after entry of the order denying
Neerings1 motion for a new trial and to amend judgment.
The
third notice of appeal was filed September 27, 1989 (R., p. 357),
23 3 days after entry of summary judgment and 19 6 days after
entry of the order denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial.
6

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Neerings failed to file a timely notice of appeal and this
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The Archives and Records Services an£ Information Practices
Act was not intended to apply to the judicial branch of state
government.
subject

to

The Bar falls under the judicial branch and is not
the

Act-

Neerings1

cause

of

action

premised

on

defendants1 alleged violation of the Act is without merit.
If the Act is construed to apply to defendants, it is an
impermissible intrusion into the exclusive province of this Court
to regulate the practice the law and violates Article V of the
Constitution of Utah.
The Constitution of Utah contains no provision giving rise
to a right of privacy.

Neerings1 cause of action based on an

alleged violation of a right of privacy under the Constitution of
Utah is without merit.
The internal policies and practices of the Bar do not create
in Neerings a right of privacy which would not otherwise exist.
His cause of action based on such a right of privacy is without
merit.
Neerings failed to establish the "publicity" element of a
common law right of privacy.

In any event, the matter which was
7

the subject of the alleged "publicity11 was not a private matter.
Additionally, the matter publicized was not of a kind which would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

The district court's

ruling that Neerings failed to establish all elements of a common
law

cause

of

action

for

an

invasion

of

privacy

should

be

affirmed.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
TO HEAR THIS APPEAL

Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure2 provides
that the notice of appeal "shall be filed with the clerk of the
trial

court

within

30

days

after

judgment or order appealed from."
appeal

is

jurisdictional;

the

date

of

entry

of

the

Timely filing of the notice of

failure

to

file

within

the

period prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction.

30-day
See,

e.g., State In Re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The order granting defendants1 motion for summary judgment
was entered by the trial court on February 6, 1989.
Neerings1

All four of

notices of appeal were filed more than 3 0 days after

entry of that order.

Unless the time for filing a notice of

2

At the time of the events in this case, the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court were in effect. Those rules were supplanted
on April 1, 1990 by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Since
the two sets of rules are identical in all material respects,
reference will be made herein solely to the current Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
8

appeal was extended, Neerings1 notices of appeal are not timely
and this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that if one of four enumerated motions is timely filed in the
trial court, "the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry

of the

order denying"

that motion.

Any notice of

appeal filed before the disposition of such a motion is without
effect.

A new notice of appeal must be filed within 3 0 days

following entry of the trial court order disposing of the motion,
Neerings filed a timely motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the Rule
4(b) motions which extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
On March 15, 1989, the trial court entered an order denying that
motion.
March

9,

Under Rule 4(b), Neerings1 first notice of appeal, filed
1989, was premature and without

effect.

Under Rule

4(b), Neerings had 30 days after entry of the order denying his
motion for a new trial to file a new notice of appeal.

Neerings1

second, third, and fourth notices of appeal were filed 83, 196,
and

246

Neerings1

days

respectively

motion

after

entry

of

the

order

denying

for a new trial.

None of those notices of

to

motion

appeal was timely.
In

addition

the

Rule

59(b)

for

a

new

trial,

Neerings also filed in the district court a "Motion/Request for
9

Findings."
argued

In previous motions before this Court, Neerings has

that

the

"Motion/Request

for

Findings"

is

one

of

the

motions enumerated in Rule 4(b) which extend the time for filing
a

notice

of

appeal.

Specifically,

Neerings

argues

that

the

"Motion/Request for Findings" is a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that the time for filing
his notice of appeal is extended until 3 0 days after entry of the
order disposing of the motion/request.
The sole issue this Court needs to resolve with respect to
jurisdiction is whether Neerings1
is in reality a Rule 52(b) motion.

"Motion/Request

for Findings"

If it is, Neerings1

fourth

notice of appeal, filed November 16, 1989, is timely, since it
was filed within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of
Neerings1

"Motion/Request for Findings."3

If the motion/request

is not a Rule 52(b) motion, its filing does not extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal

and Neerings1

fourth

notice of

appeal was not timely, having been filed far more than 3 0 days
after entry of the order denying the motion for a new trial.

J

The order disposing of Neerings1
"Motion/Request
for
Findings" was entered November 1, 1989.
Two previous orders
disposing of the motion/request had been entered but were
subsequently set aside by the trial court due to procedural
irregularities (See, R., pp. 248, 266-271, 274-276, 297-299, 326327, 349-356, 362-369, 373-375).
10

This Court should determine that Neerings!

"Motion/Request

for Findings" is not a Rule 52(b) motion for two reasons.

First,

the face of the motion/request indicates that it is not a Rule
52(b) motion*

Second, Neerings himself did not consider it as a

Rule 52(b) motion.
Language of the Motion/Request
Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings" was filed eight days
after the district court's minute entry ruling that defendants'
motion

for

summary

motion/request
arguments

argued

judgment
that

should

be

defendants

had

granted.
set

The

forth

five

in support of their motion for summary judgment but

that the court's minute entry "did not specify which, if any, of
the defendants' grounds asserted the Court relied upon."

The

motion/request then stated as follows:
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not
require findings of fact in support of summary judgment
motions, however subsection (a) of that rule requires
that "The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules ... 56, ... when the motion is
based on more than one ground."
The motion/request then requested the trial court "to issue
a

brief

written

statement

of

the

ground(s)

for

granting the defendants summary judgment herein."

its

decision

Nowhere did

the motion/request cite or purport to be pursuant to Rule 52(b).
11

Nowhere

did

the

motion/request

ask

the

court

to

amend

its

findings or make additional findings, as provided in Rule 52(b).
Indeed, such a request would have been inappropriate since the
court never entered any findings.

The motion/request was nothing

more than what it purported on its face to be: a request pursuant
to Rule 52(a) that the court issue a brief written statement of
the

grounds

for

its

summary judgment.

decision

defendants1

granting

motion

for

Such a motion is not one of those listed in

Rule 4(b) as extending the time for filing a notice of appeal.
Neerings did not consider the motion/request as a Rule 52(b)
motion
As indicated above, Neerings1 "Motion/Request for Findings11
requested the district court to issue a brief written statement
identifying

the

grounds

upon

which

it

defendants1 motion for summary judgment.
the

district

motion/request

court,
and

by

issued

minute
the

relied

granting

On February 15, 1989,

entry,

brief

in

written

responded

to

statement

the

it had

requested (R., p. 227).
During
effort

to

the

three

have

an

months
order

"Motion/Request for Findings.11
with

the

district

court's

that

followed,

entered

with

Neerings
regard

made
to

no
his

Neerings was apparently satisfied

minute

entry

giving

him

written statement his motion/request had requested.
12

the

brief

Neerings had

filed his notice of appeal and apparently considered the case to
be at the appellate review stage.
What Neerings considered his motion/request to be suddenly
changed,

however,

when

defendants

filed

in

this

Court

their

motion to dismiss Neerings1 appeal based on the argument that his
first notice
effect.

of appeal

was

filed

prematurely

and was without

The day after defendants filed their motion to dismiss,

Neerings began efforts

in the district court to transform the

Rule 52(a) motion/request, with no effect on the time for filing
a notice of appeal, into a Rule 52(b) motion, which extends the
time for filing a notice of appeal.
change

the

fact

that

Neerings

Such belated efforts do not

himself

did

not

consider

his

motion/request to be a Rule 52(b) motion.
The timeline on the next page illustrates the salient facts
of

this

case

jurisdiction.

with

regard

to

the

question

of

this

Court's

The 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal

began to run on March 15, 1989 when the district court entered
its order denying Neerings1 motion for a new trial.
4(b), Neerings1

Under Rule

first notice of appeal, filed before that order

was entered, was premature and without effect.

Neerings1 second,

third, and fourth notices of appeal were filed far more than 3 0
days after entry of the order denying Neerings1 motion for a new
trial

and were not timely.

Neerings
13

failed to file a timely

notice of appeal, and t h i s Court lacks jurisdiction to hear t h i s
appeal.

Feb 6

Mar 9

Mar 15

Apr 15

30 day period for
filing notice of
appeal - Rule 4(b];
U.R.A.P.

Summary
judgment
entered

1st
notice
of appeal
filed

Order
denying
"Motion
for New
Trial &
To Amend
Judgment"

June 6
/

Sept 27

VA

" 7

Nov 16

-/f-

2nd

3rd

notice

notice

4 th
notice

of

of

of

appeal
filed

appeal
filed

appeal
filed

B. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
THE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES
AND INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
Neerings1 first cause of action in his amended complaint is
based on the provisions of the Archives and Records Services and
Information Practices Act, Utah Code Ann- section 63-2-59 et seq.
(1953 as amended) (the Act).

In connection with their motion for

summary judgment in the trial court, defendants argued that they
were not subject to the Act

since the Bar falls under the
14

judicial branch of state government and the Act was not intended
to apply to the judicial branch.
no cause

of action

violation of the Act.
for summary based

As a consequence, Neerings had

against defendants

based

on their

alleged

The trial court granted defendants' motion

on that argument.

The ruling of the trial

court is correct and, if this Court decides that it does not lack
jurisdiction, that ruling should be affirmed.
In

1981, this

Court,

exercising

its

inherent

power 4

to

regulate the practice of law (see, In Re Disciplinary Action of
McCune, 717 P.2d
Integration

and

Integration).
Bar,

632

P. 2d

701, 702
Management

(Utah 1986)), adopted the Rules for
of

the

Utah

State

Bar

(Rules

for

In Re Integration and Governance of the Utah State
845

(Utah

1981).

Pursuant

to

the

Rules

for

Integration, this Court "perpetuate[d], create[d] and continue[d]
under the direction and control of [the] Court an organization
known as the Utah State Bar."
(emphasis

added).

Having

Rules for Integration, Rule (A) 1

been

created

by

this

Court

and

operating under its direction and control, the Bar falls under
the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of state government.

4

The inherent power to regulate the practice of law was made
explicit in 1985 when Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution was amended to provide that the "supreme court by
rule shall govern the practice of law."
15

The language of the Act manifests a clear intention that its
provisions do not apply to the judicial branch.

Section 63-2-79

of the Act states as follows:
Upon request, the archivist shall assist and advise the
establishment of records-management programs in the
legislative and judicial branches of state government
and shall, as required by them, provide program
services similar to those available to the executive
branch of state government pursuant to the provisions
of this act.
Neerings

argues

in his

brief

that

although

the

records-

management provisions of the Act may not apply to the judicial
branch, the information practices provisions of the Act 5 are not
so limited.
which

Neerings1

indicate

provides

that

Administrative

argument

otherwise.
the

For

executive

Services

ignores provisions of the Act

shall

example,

director
promulgate

of

section
the

63-2-85.3

Department

rules which

apply

of
to

state systems of data on individuals and which shall provide for
the

implementation

certain standards.

of

the

enforcement

and

administration

of

Among those standards is the following:

b

Utah Code Ann. sections 63-2-85.1 through 63-2-85.4.
Before 1979, the information practices provisions were found in
the Utah Information Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. sections 6350-1 through 63-50-10e
In 1979, the Legislature repealed the
Utah Information Practices Act and amended the Archives and
Records Service Act, Utah Code Ann. sections 63-2-59 through 632-87, to include information practices provisions similar to
those previously found in the Utah Information Practices Act.
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(1) Collection of data on individuals . . . shall be
limited to that necessary for the administration and
management of programs enacted by the Legislature or by
executive order,
(Emphasis added.)
Additionally,

the

information

practices

provisions

impose

certain responsibilities on "responsible authorities" as defined
in the Act.

The Act's definition of "responsible authority" is

as follows:
"Responsible authority" means any state office or state
official established by law or executive order as the
body
responsible
for the collection, use, or
supervision of any set of data on individuals or
summary data.
(Emphasis added.)
As indicated above, the Bar was created by the Rules for
Integration

adopted

by

this

Court

in

established by law or executive order.

1981.

It

was

not

The Act was not intended

to apply to the Bar, an arm of the judicial branch.
This conclusion
the

executive

is reinforced by the rules promulgated by

director

of

the

Department

of

Administrative

Services pursuant to authority granted in the Act (Utah Code Ann.
section

63-2-85.3).

Administrative

Those

rules

are

located

Code, Rules R3-1, R3-2, and

R3-3.

in

the
Rule

Utah
3-2-1

provides in relevant part as follows:
This rule shall apply to all state agencies.... This
rule applies to state offices and state officials which
are established
by law or executive
order as
17

responsible for the collection or use of any set of
data on individuals or summary data.... This rule and
related Archives are not mandatory for the Legislative
and Judicial branches of State government except as
provided by law. Those branches may adopt or not adopt
this rule and related procedures or parts thereof as
they desire.
(Emphasis added.)
While an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute
is not necessarily conclusive, it should be given considerable
weight.

E.g., Bayle v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission

of Utah, 700 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1985) ("The construction of a
statute

by

the

administration
Court.");
P.2d

accorded
agency

will

Concerned

629,

633

an

governmental
be

Parents

(Utah

agency's

is charged

given

1982)

agency

considerable

of Step-children
("Judicial

interpretation

with

charged

of

with

its

by

this

weight

v. Mitchell, 645

deference

is

a

which

statute

enforcing.,"); and Wells

Fargo

usually
that

Armored

Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 626 P.2d 450,
451

(Utah

1981) ("[S]ome deference

is due interpretation of a

statute placed on it by the adminstrative agency which has the
responsibility for administering that statute.").
Despite the plain

language of the Act indicating that it

does not apply to the judicial branch, Neerings argues in his
brief that the Bar is a "state agency" and is therefore subject
to the Actc

Neerings cites a Tenth Circuit Court case where the
18

court held that for purposes of the "state action" analysis under
42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Bar is a "state agency."

Neerings

concludes that the Bar must also be a "state agency" for purposes
of the Act.
Designation of the Bar as a "state agency" in one context
does

not

dictate

its

status

in another

context.

See,

e.g.,

Washington State Bar Association vs. Graham, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash
1976).

The

critical

inquiry

is whether the Bar

is a "state

agency" as that term is defined and used in the Act.
"State

agency"

division,

board,

authority,

or

Utah

Ann.

Code

is

defined

bureau,

other

in

the

Act

commission,

as

council,

unit, however designated,

section

63-2-61(2).

"a

At

department,
institution,

of the state."

first

blush,

this

definition appears sufficiently broad to include the Bar.

The

context within which the term is found within the Act, however,
makes

it

clear

that

the

term

does

not

include

the

judicial

branch.
The records-management provisions of the Act impose certain
duties on the head of each "state agency."
section

63-2-77.

As

discussed

above,

E.g. , Utah Code Ann.

however,

the

records-

management provisions clearly apply only to the executive branch
of

state

government.

Section

63-2-75

provides

that

"the

archivist shall establish and administer in the executive branch
19

of state government a records management program..."
added).

Section

63-2-79

states

that

the

(emphasis

records-management

program is optional with the legislative and judicial branches of
government.

Use of the term "state agency" in the context of a

records-management

program

intended

to

apply

only

to

the

executive branch manifests a clear intention that the term "state
agency" relates only the executive branch.

The Bar is not a

"state agency" as that term is defined and used in the Act.
Even if the Bar were considered to be a "state agency" as
defined by the Act, Neerings would nevertheless have no basis for
his cause of action premised

on the Act.

Neerings1

claim

is

based on an alleged violation of either section 63-2-85.3(4) or
section 63-2-85.4(4). 6
forth

obligations

defined

in

the

Both of those provisions, however, set

imposed

Act.

As

upon

a

discussed

"responsible
above,

the

authority"
Bar

is

as

not a

"responsible authority", as that term is defined in the Act, and
is not

subject

to

the obligations

imposed

by those sections.

Nowhere in those sections is there any indication that they apply
to a "state agency."

Even if the Bar were considered a "state

6

These were the only two provisions cited by Neerings in his
brief which could possibly have been violated by the defendants1
alleged disclosure of Neerings1 bar examination and appeal
results.
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agency11, therefore, no liability could be imposed for an alleged
violation of those sections.
The Act was not intended to apply to the Bar, an arm of the
judicial

branch

of

state

government.

The

district

court1s

summary judgment in favor of defendants should be affirmed.
C. IF THE ACT IS CONSTRUED TO APPLY
TO THE BAR, IT VIOLATES ARTICLE V
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Even assuming that the Act was intended to apply to the Bar,
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendants was
correct and should be affirmed.

If the Act were construed to

impose

the

requirements

impermissible

on

the

intrusion

Bar,

by the

Act

Legislature

would
into

constitute
the

an

exclusive

province of the judicial branch of government, in violation of
Article V of the Constitution of Utah.
As discussed

above, inherent

in the judicial authority of

the Utah Supreme Court is the power to regulate the practice of
law.
that

Article V section 1 of the Constitution of Utah provides
"no person

belonging

to

charged

one of

with

the

exercise

of powers

properly

[the other branches of government]

shall

exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others...."
The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this
state

are

independent

powers of the others.

of

each

other.

None

can

exercise

the

This not only prevents an assumption by
21

one department of power not belonging to it but also prohibits
the imposition by one of any duty upon the others not within the
scope of its jurisdiction.
abstain

from

departments.

and

not

encroach

on

the

powers

of

the

other

Power must be exercised by the department to which

it naturally belongs.
accomplish

It is the duty of each department to

all

department."

Each department has the "inherent right to

objects

naturally

within

the

orbit

of

that

In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assc., 2 75

N.W. 265, 266 (Neb. 1937).
Several cases support the conclusion that application of the
Act to the Bar would violate the separation of powers doctrine.
In

Sharood

Minnesota

v.

Hatfield,

210

N.W.

2d

275

(Minn.

1973),

the

Supreme Court struck down a statute which sought to

divert state bar membership dues into the general revenue fund of
the state and subject these funds to legislative appropriation.
The

court

statutes

held

that

relating

unconstitutional

despite

to
as

an

the

past

practice

unlawful

acquiescence
of

law,

usurpation

under the separation of powers doctrine.

in

this
of

regulatory
statute

judicial

was

power

The court noted that

some of the statutory provisions were well motivated and that the
court might wish to adopt some of the provisions by rule but that
the

statutes

prerogative.

were
id.

nevertheless
at 280.

not

a permissible

The separation
22

legislative

of powers

doctrine

prevents

an

assumption

by

the

belonging to the judiciary.

legislature

Id. at 279.

of powers

properly

To permit the statute

to stand would result in usurpation by the legislature of the
judicial function of regulating the practice of law.
stated

that

regulations
exclusively

"the

governing
in

encroachment

power

the

to

the

make
Bar

Supreme

the

was

Court,

necessary

intended

free

The court

from

rules

to
the

be

and

vested

dangers

of

either by the legislative or executive branches."

Id. at 2 80.
In In Re Washington State Bar Assoc. , 548 P.2d 310 (Wash.
1976),

the

court

powerfully

asserted

its

inherent

judicial

authority to govern the legal profession and the practice of law.
In that case, the state auditor was prohibited from auditing the
state

bar

pursuant

"state agencies."

to

a statute which

required

the

audit

of

The holding was based on the principle that

"the regulation of the practice of law in this state is within
the inherent power of this Court."

JEd. at 315.

This decision

extended to the bar association the court's power to administer
its own funds without legislative or executive interference.
auditor

was

denied

access

to

the

bar

association's

because the bar association was considered

The

records

to be part of the

judicial branch and therefore free to spend its funds as it saw
fit.
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In Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky.
1980),

the

state

auditor

attempted

accounts of the state bar association.

to

audit

the

books

and

The court held that the

auditor had no power to audit these funds since they were under
the

exclusive

statutes

control

regulated

of

the

judiciary.

the practice of law.

In

Kentucky,

The court held

state
that

these statutes were superceded by a 1975 amendment to the state
constitution which in relevant part was almost identical to the
1985 amendment to the judicial article of the Constitution of
Utah.

The amendment provided that "the Supreme Court shall, by

rule, govern admission to the Bar and the discipline of members
of the Bar.11

Id. at 684.

The court held that the constitutional

amendment completely removed the subject of regulation of the Bar
from any legislative authority and rendered obsolete the statutes
pertaining to it.

The court held the statutory provisions void

because they purported to erect powers and limitations that did
not fall within the legislative province.

Xd.

v. State Board of Law Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d

See also, Pasik
270

(N.Y. 1984)

(The court held that plaintiff, who sought certain

information

from the New York Bar concerning his bar examination pursuant to
provisions of the freedom of information law, was not entitled to
the information since the judiciary was exempted from the law and
the Bar was a part of the judiciary.).
24

Similarly, to the extent the Act purports to apply to the
Bar, it is an impermissible intrusion by the Legislature into the
exclusive province this Court in the exercise of its judicial
function to regulate the practice of law.
cannot

constitutionally

be applied

to the

Accordingly, the Act
Bar.

The district

court's summary judgment in favor of defendants was correct and
should be affirmed.
D. THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH DOES NOT
CREATE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS ALLEGED
BY NEERINGS; EVEN IF SUCH A RIGHT EXISTS,
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT VIOLATED IT
In

his

second

cause

of

action,

Neerings

alleges

that

"defendants have failed to comply with the Utah Constitutional
right with regard to privacy and have violated the plaintiff's
right to privacy by giving members of the public private and
confidential information regarding the plaintiff" (R., pp. 84 and
85 at para* 28) .

The district court granted defendants summary

judgment as to this cause of action.

The district court's ruling

is correct and should be affirmed.
A thorough
provision
Neerings.

giving

review of the Constitution of Utah reveals no
rise

to

a

right

of

privacy

as

alleged

by

There is no Utah case law establishing that such a

right arises from the Constitution of Utah.

The only right of

privacy existing under the Constitution of Utah is that stemming
from Article I section 14, relating to unreasonable searches and
25

seizures.

That provision

clearly

has

no application

to this

case.
In

his

brief,

Neerings

argues

that

such

a

right

because the Legislature referred to a "constitutional
of privacy"
section

in the legislative

63-2-60(2,)

of

the

Information Practices Act. 7
a

right does not create

exists

. . . right

intent section, Utah Code Ann.

Archives

and

Records

Services

and

The Legislature's reference to such

it where

it otherwise does not exist

under the provisions of the Constitution of Utah.

There simply

is no provision in the Constitution of Utah establishing such a
right of privacy.
Neerings also argues in his brief that this Court recognized
a "right to privacy" in the case of Redding v. Brady, 606 P. 2d
1193

(Utah

1980) .

Court

in

Redding

In referring to the right of privacy, the
cited

United

States

Supreme

Court

cases

involving the right of privacy under the federal constitution.
The right of privacy mentioned by the Court in Redding is that
arising

under

the

federal

constitution,

not

under

the

Constitution of Utah.
Even

assuming

that

a

right

of

privacy

exists

under

the

Constitution of Utah as alleged by Neerings, there has been no
7

It is not clear whether the Legislature was referring to a
right of privacy under the Constitution of Utah or under the
Constitution of the United States.
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invasion

of

that

right

in this

case.

Disclosure

of

public

information cannot be deemed to be a violation of any right of
privacy.
In this case, Neerings alleges that defendants disclosed the
results of his bar examination.

Even if defendants made such a

disclosure, the information was readily
some members of the public.

available to at least

Neerings himself agreed that anyone

taking the bar examination at the same time would have known that
he failed the examination when his name did not appear in the
published list of names of those who passed (Neerings depo., pp.
31 and 32).
No right of privacy exists under the Constitution of Utah.
Even if such a right exists, it has not been violated
case.

in this

This Court should affirm the summary judgment in favor of

defendants.
E.

In his

THE INTERNAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF
THE BAR DO NOT CREATE A RIGHT TO
PRIVACY IN NEERINGS

third

cause

of action, Neerings

alleges that the

Bar's internal policies, practices, rules, and regulations give
rise to some right of privacy in favor of Neerings
and 86) .

(R. , pp. 85

The district court granted defendants summary judgment

as to this cause of action.

The lower court f s ruling was correct

and should be affirmed.
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There
internal

is no authority

policies

for the proposition that the Bar's

and practices

create

a right of privacy

favor of Neerings which would not otherwise exist.

in

As discussed

in section F below, the facts of this case do not give rise to a
cause of action for a violation of Neerings1 common law right to
privacy.

Any right of privacy Neerings may have is defined by

law, not by the Bar's internal policies and procedures.
In his brief, Neerings cites several cases in support of the
proposition that generally accepted practices within a profession
are

relevant

to

establish

the

standard

of

care

(Brief

of

Appellant, p. 28). Those cases have no application to this case,
where Neerings alleges not that the Bar's policies and practices
give rise to a standard of care but that they give rise to a
right of privacy.

In any event, this case involves only the

practices and internal policies of the Bar.

There is nothing in

this case to suggest that the Bar's policy of not disclosing bar
examination
profession.

results

is

the

standard

of

care

within

the

The summary judgment in favor of defendants should

be affirmed.
F.

NEERINGS FAILED TO ESTABLISH
ALL ELEMENTS OF A COMMON LAW

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY
Neerings1 fourth cause of action alleges an invasion of his
common

law right of privacy.

The district
28

court

agreed

with

defendants1

argument

that

Neerings

failed

to

establish

all

elements of such a cause of action and granted defendants summary
judgment.

The district court's ruling was correct and should be

affirmed.
Neerings1

cause of action for invasion of his common law

right to privacy is based upon the provisions of the Restatement
(2d) of Torts, section 652D (1977), which was at least impliedly
approved by this Court in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988).
That section provides as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
With regard to the publicity given to a matter concerning
the private life of another, comment (a) of section 652D states
as follows:
"Publicity" means that the matter is made public, by
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many
persons
that
the matter must
be
regarded
as
substantially
certain to become
one of public
knowledge....
The difference is not one of the means
of communication ... [but] one of a communication that
reaches, or is sure to reach the public.
In Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986), Eddy sued his
employer

for invasion of privacy under section

652D.

Only a

limited number of Eddy's co-workers heard that he was undergoing
29

psychiatric

treatment.

The

Oklahoma

Supreme

Court

stated

as

follows:
These facts, even when taken in the light most
favorable to Eddy do not amount to "publicity" in the
sense of a disclosure to the general public —
the
extent of publicity required in order to give rise to
an action for public disclosure of private facts.
Id. at 78.
The Kansas Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion
Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d
plaintiff's

psychiatrist

plaintiff's

divorce

1250

wrote

a

letter

a

the

Citing

section

652D,

the

court

for

in

which the plaintiff posed to herself and to her children.
to

concern

judge

danger

(a)

expressing

to

In that case,

the

comment

action

(Kan. 1985).

in

stated

that

"it

is

doubtful that these facts would support a finding that the letter
was

given

claim."
that

"it

the

necessary

Jd. at p. 1256.
is not

communicate

a

an

[private

this

case,

required

to

sustain

this

The court quoted comment (a), stating

invasion

of the

right

of

privacy

...

to

fact] to a single person or to even a

small group of persons."
In

publicity

the

Id.
alleged

disclosure

of

Neerings1

bar

examination results and the results of his appeal was made to one
person: Fasselin.

That disclosure does not rise to the level of

the "publicity" required by section 652D.
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Even if sufficient "publicity" occurred, the matter that was
the subject of the alleged disclosure was not a private matter.
As indicated above, anyone taking the bar examination at the same
time Neerings took it or who was aware that he took it would know
he failed when his name was not included in the published list of
those who passed.
Moreover, even assuming the "publicity" element is present,
the matter which was allegedly publicized—failure of the bar
examination—was not of a kind which "would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person" as required by section 652D.

Because

this and other elements of a common law cause of action for
invasion of privacy are lacking, the district court's summary
judgment

in

favor

of

defendants

affirmed.
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was

proper

and

should

be

VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request
the Court to affirm the district court's summary judgment in
favor of defendants.
Dated this 11th day of July, 1990.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
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responsible for collecting or administering the
account.
(2) The state shall comply with the procedures and
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings.
1987
63-la-6. Abstract of order is a lien.
(1) An abstract of an order of a hearing examiner
stating a default may be filed with the State Tax
Commission, and when filed, constitutes a lien to the
extent of the receivable plus interest against any
state income tax refund or overpayment due or to
become due the debtor for a period of eight years from
the date of the order, unless satisfied or otherwise
released in writing by the state.
(2) The lien created by this section shall, for the
purposes of Section 59-10-529 only, be considered a
judgment, but no credit of a tax refund or overpayment may be made on account of this lien until 20
days after the date of the hearing examiner's order.
1987

63-la-7. Judicial review — Effect on lien.
(1) A judicial review of an order of a hearing examiner may be obtained by any party filing a complaint
with the district court.
(2) A notice of the filing of a complaint may be filed
with the State Tax Commission. If notice is filed, the
tax commission may take no action with respect to
the lien created by Section 63-la-6 until the matter is
finally disposed of by the courts, except as provided in
this chapter.
1987
63-la-8.

63-2-60

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
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Bond required — Terms — Expenses of

debtor.
(1) If a complaint is filed by the debtor for a judicial review of an order entered under this chapter, the
debtor shall furnish a bond to the State Tax Commission, with good and sufficient sureties, in the amount
of the delinquent receivable or the amount of any
overpayment or refund due, whichever is less, unless
waived by the court. The lien created by Section
63-la-6 is then dissolved as to that overpayment or
refund and the overpayment or refund shall be released to the debtor.
(2) The bond shall provide that the surety will pay,
upon a final determination adverse to the debtor, the
amount of the bond or any other lesser amount as the
court may determine, to the State Tax Commission
for the use and benefit of the entity of state government obtaining the order.
(3) If the judicial review finds the claim of the state
invalid, the state shall reimburse the debtor all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred.
1986
63-la-9. Rules for implementing chapter.
The Board of Examiners may adopt rules for the
implementation of this chapter, including rules for
the conduct of hearings and appointment of hearing
examiners.
1986

Section
63-2-62.5.

Archivist charged with custody of documents.
'
63-2-63.
Powers and duties of archivist.
63-2-64.
Transfer of archives from public offices.
63-2-65.
Records declared property of state —
Disposition.
63-2-66.
Access to public records — Certified copies.
63-2-67.
Records located in public offices — Right
of archivist to inspect, to replevin.
63-2-68.
State Records Committee created —
Composition — Meetings — Executive
secretary.
63-2-68.1. State Records Committee — Classification authority and duties.
63-2-69.
Records of public offices — Disposition.
63-2-70.
Microphotography off state records —
Standards.
63-2-71.
Use of materials to preserve public
records.
63-2-72.
Repealed.
63-2-73.
Public records — disposal by state
agency without approval prohibited.
63-2-74.
Repealed.
63-2-75.
Establishment of records-management
program in executive branch.
63-2-7(5.
Records-management program — Duties
of archivist.
63-2-77.
Records-management program — Duties
of state agencies.
63-2-78.
Other governing bodies to promote principles of efficient records management
— Archivist to assist with local programs.
63-2-79.
Records management — Archivist to assist legislative and judicial branches if
requested.
63-2-80.
Purchases of filing and microfilm equipment — Approval, and standards.
63-2-81 to 63-2-83. Repealed.
63-2-84.
Charges for state publications.
63-2-85.
Repealed.
63-2-85.1.
Identification of authorities collecting or
using data.
63-2-85.2.
Report on information practices — Contents.
63-2-85.3.
Rules.
63-2-85.4. Rights of individuals on whom data
stored — Data in dispute, procedure.
63-2-86.
Rules.
63-2-87.
Violation of act a misdemeanor.
63-2-88.
Violation of act — Liability for damages
— Injunction.
63-2-89.
Exemptions from act
63-2-90, 63-2-91. Repealed.
63-2-1 to 63-2-58.

Repealed.
1963,1965,1969,1972,
1974.1977,1979,1980,1981

ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES

63-2-59. Short title.
This act is known as the "Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act."
1985

Section
63-2-1 to 63-2-58. Repealed.
63-2-59.
Short title.
63-2-60.
Legislative intent.
63-2-61.
Definitions.
63-2-62.
Creation — Archivist and records administrator — Appointment — Qualifications.

63-2-60. Legislative i n t e n t
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to create a
central archives and records service within the Department of Administrative Services to administer
the archives, records management, and information
system programs of the state and to apply fair, efficient, and economical management methods to the
collection, creation, utilization, maintenance, reten-

CHAPTER 2
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tion, preservation, disclosure, and disposal of state
records and documents.
(2) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes
two fundamental constitutional rights: (a) the right of
privacy in relation to personal data gathered by state
agencies, and <b) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business. It is the intent of the Legislature to establish
fair information practices to prevent abuse of personal information by state agencies while protecting
the public's right of easy and reasonable access to
unrestricted public records.
1885
63-2-61. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Public records" means all books, papers,
letters, documents, maps, plans, photographs,
sound recordings, management information systems, or other documentary materials, regardless
of physical form or characteristics, made or received, and retained by any state public office
under state law or in connection with the transaction of public business by the public offices,
agencies, and institutions of the state and its
counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions. The term "public records" does not include preliminary drafts or personal notes made
or received, and retained by the public agency in
the ordinary course of business, unless, in the
opinion of the State Records Committee, a public
interest in subjecting these records to the classification procedures of this act clearly outweighs
the public interest in exempting them from classification, and unless the records, or the data, or
class of data in these records is otherwise controlled by law.
(2) "State agency" means a department, division, board, bureau, commission, council, institution, authority, or other unit, however designated, of the state.
(3) "Public offices" and "public officers" mean,
respectively, the offices and officers of any court,
department, division, board, commission, bureau,
council, authority, institution, or other agency of
the state or any of its political subdivisions.
(4) "Archivist" means the state archivist and
records administrator.
(5) "State publication" or "publication" means
any document, compilation, journal, law, resolution, blue book, statute, code, register, pamphlet,
book, report, hearing, legislative bill, leaflet, order, rule, directory, periodical, or magazine issued in print by the state, any officer of the state,
the Legislature, or any state agency.
(6) "Records committee" means the State
Records Committee.
(7) "Data on individuals" means all records,
files, and processes which contain any data on
any individual and which are kept or intended to
be kept by state government, including, but not
limited to, that data by which it is possible to
identify with reasonable certainty the person to
whom the information pertains.
(8) "Responsible authority" means any state
office or state official established by law or executive order as the body responsible for the collection, use, or supervision of any set of data on
individuals or summary data.
(9) "Summary data" means statistical records
and reports derived from data on individuals but
in which individuals are not identified and from
which neither their identities nor any other char-
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acteristic t h a t could uniquely identify an individual is ascertainable.
(10) "Public data" means data on individuals
collected and maintained by state government
which is not classified as private data or confidential data under this chapter and is therefore
open to the public, unless otherwise exempted or
restricted from disclosure by law.
(11) "Confidential data" means data on individuals collected and maintained by state government which is available only to appropriate
agencies for the use specified in Subsection
63-2-85.3 (1) and to others by express consent of
the individual, but not to the individual himself.
(12) "Private data" means data on individuals
collected and maintained by state government
which is available only to the appropriate state
agencies for the uses specified in Subsection
63-2-85.3 (1), to others by the express consent of
the individual, and to the individual himself or
next of kin when information is needed to acquire benefits due a deceased person.
(13) "Classification" means a determination
made under this act by a responsible authority or
the State Records Committee designating data
on individuals or a system of state records containing data on individuals as public data, private data, or confidential data.
(14) "Record series" means a group or system
of public records which may be treated as a unit
for purposes of description, management, or disposition.
1985
63-2-62.

Creation — Archivist and records administrator — Appointment — Qualifi-

cations.
iThere is created in the Department of Administrative Services a centralized archives and records service which shall administer the state's archives and
records management programs, including storage of
reteords, central microfilm lab processing, and microfilm quality control. The executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, with the approval of the governor, shall appoint an archivist and
records administrator who is qualified by archival education, training, and experience to direct the Division of Archives and Records.
1985
60-2-62.5.

Archivist charged with c u s t o d y of
documents.
JThe archivist is charged with custody of the following:
(1) the enrolled copy of the constitution;

(2) the acts and resolutions passed by the Legislature;
(3) all books, records, deeds, parchments,
maps, and papers kept or deposited with the archivist pursuant to law;
(4) the journals of the Legislature, and all
bills, resolutions, memorials, petitions, and
claims introduced in the Senate or the House of
Representatives;
(5) oaths of office of all state officials; and
(6) descriptions of seals in use by the different
state officers. The archivist shall furnish such
officers with new seals whenever required.
1984

63-2-63. Powers and duties of archivist.
(1) The archivist shall staff and organize the archives and records service to administer the following
functions as provided by this act:
(a) the state archives;
(b) a records management program;
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(c) central microfilm laboratory processing
and microfilm quality control; and
(d) information practices.
(2) T h e executive director of administrative services m a y direct t h a t other functions or services for
which t h e executive director is responsible be administered by the archives and records service.
1885
63-2-64. Transfer o f archives from public offices.
The archivist shall administer the Utah State Archives. The archivist shall be the official custodian of
all noncurrent public records of permanent and historic value which are not required by law to remain
in the custody of the agency of origin. This custodianship includes both physical possession and legal title.
Unless otherwise directed by law, all records of any
public office in the state shall, upon the termination
of the existence and functions of that office, be transferred to the custody of the archivist.
1985
63-2-65. Records declared property of state —
Disposition.
All public records made or received by or under the
authority of or coming into the custody, control or
possession of public officials of this state in the course
of their public duties are the property of the state and
shall not be mutilated, destroyed, transferred, removed or otherwise damaged or disposed of, in whole
or in part, except as provided by law.
1969
63-2-66. A c c e s s t o public records — Certified
copies.
The archivist shall keep the public records in archives' custody in such arrangement and condition as
to make them accessible, unless otherwise restricted
by law, for convenient use and shall permit them to
be inspected, examined, abstracted, or copied at reasonable times under his supervision by any person.
The archivist shall, upon the demand of any person,
furnish certified copies upon payment in advance of
reasonable fees as determined by the director of the
Department of Administrative Services. Copies of
public records transferred under law from the office of
origin to the custody of the archivist when certified
by t h e archivist under the seal of the Utah State Archives have the same legal force and effect as if certified by their original custodian.
1985
63-2-67. Records located in public offices —
Right of archivist to inspect, to replevin.
The archivist, in person or through a deputy, shall
have t h e right of reasonable access to and examination of all public archives in Utah, with a view to
securing their safety and preservation. The attorney
general, on behalf of the state of Utah or the archivist, may replevin any public records which are not
adequately protected or cared for or which were formerly part of the records or files of any public office of
the territory or state of Utah.
1968
63-2-68. State Records Committee created —
Composition — Meetings — Executive
secretary.
There is created a State Records Committee composed of the archivist, the state auditor, the director
of the Division of State History, the attorney general
or his designee, a n d a citizen member appointed by
the governor at t h e recommendation of the members
of the committee. The records committee shall meet
at least once every quarter to review the policies and
programs for the collection, classification, retention,
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disclosure, and disposal of state records. The archivist
shall serve as executive secretary of the records committee.
1985
63-2-68.1. State Records Committee — Classification authority and duties.
The State Records Committee h a s the following
classification authority and duties:
(1) to review the designations made by a responsible authority and to reclassify any data on
individuals or systems of data on individuals
maintained by state agencies, upon petition by
the responsible authority, by the individual who
is the subject of the data, or by any interested
party, except as otherwise provided by law;
(2) to initiate at its own discretion the designation and classification of data on individuals or
systems of data on individuals maintained by
state agencies, except as otherwise provided by
law;
(3) to adopt rules regulating its own meetings
and procedures consistent with Chapter 4, Title
52, on open and public meetings, and any other
applicable provision of law; and
(4) upon request, to make atailable to the legislative and judicial branche$ of state government, and political subdivisions of the state, the
classification review which ij; is authorized to
perform by this act.
i985
63-2-69. Records of public offices — Disposition.
Every custodian of public records of the state shall
submit to the records committee, in accordance with
standards established by the archivist, schedules proposing the length of time each records series should
be retained. No records series may be destroyed without the prior approval of the records committee. T h e
records committee shall determine whether t h e
records in question are of administrative, legal, fiscal,
research, or historical valuer Those records
unanimously determined to be of ho administrative,
legal, fiscal, research, or historical value shall be disposed of by any method the records committee may
specify. A list of all records so disposed of, together
with a statement certifying compliance with this act,
signed by members of the records committee, shall be
filed and preserved in the offic^ from which t h e
records were drawn and in the files of each of t h e
other officers who are signatories to the certificate.
Records having future value may be transferred to
the Utah State Archives. Public records in t h e custody of the archivist may be disposed of upon a similar determination by the records committee a n d t h e
head of the agency from which ttye records were received.
1985
63-2-70. Microphotography of! state r e c o r d s —
Standards.
Public records may be microphotographed when it
is determined to be cost effective for the care, maintenance, retrieval, security, and preservation of t h e
records. The microphotography shall comply with t h e
minimum standards of quality approved by t h e
American National Standards Institute, and t h e Association for Information and Image Management.
Records microphotographed in accordance with these
standards have the same force and effect as the originals, including introduction in evidence in all courts
or administrative agencies. A transcript, exemplification, or certified copy made in accordance with this
section is deemed to be a transcript, exemplification,
or certified copy of the original. T h e archives shall
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keep one copy of microphotographed records at a vital
records site as prescribed in the state retention schedule. Upon review and approval of the microphotographed film by the archivist, t h e source documents
may be destroyed.
l««5
63-2-71. Use of materials t o p r e s e r v e public
records.
With a view to the preservation of public records,
the chief procurement officer and public officials shall
consult with the archivist to assure that all paper,
ink, and other materials used in public offices in the
state for the purposes of permanent records shall be of
durable quality.
1981
63-2-72. Repealed.

1987

63-2-73. Public records — Disposal b y state
agency without approval prohibited.
No public records shall be destroyed or otherwise
disposed of by any state agency unless it is determined by the archivist and t h e records committee
that the record has no further administrative, legal,
fiscal, research, or historical value.
1969
63-2-74. Repealed.

1985

63-2-75. Establishment o f r e c o r d s - m a n a g e m e n t
program in e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h .
The archivist shall establish and administer in the
executive branch of state government a records management program which will apply efficient and economical management methods to t h e creation, utilization, maintenance, retention, preservation, and disposal of state records.
1985
63-2-76. Records-management program — Duties of archivist
The archivist shall, with due regard for the function of the agencies concerned:
(1) establish standards, procedures, and techniques for the effective m a n a g e m e n t of records.
(2) make continuing surveys of active office
operations and recommend improvements in current records-management practices including the
use of space, equipment, automation, and supplies employed in creating, maintaining, storing,
and servicing records.
(3) establish standards for t h e preparation of
schedules providing for t h e retention of state
records of continuing value and for t h e prompt
and orderly disposal of state records no longer
possessing sufficient administrative, historical,
legal, or fiscal value to w a r r a n t their further retention.
(4) obtain reports from state agencies required
for the administration of t h e program.
(5) establish, maintain, a n d operate a n archives and records center t h a t meets federal specifications for the storing, processing, and servicing of records for state agencies pending their
deposit with the Utah state archives or their disposition in any other m a n n e r prescribed by law.
(6) establish, maintain, a n d operate centralized microfilm lab processing and microfilm quality control for state agencies. Upon completion of
a micrographic feasibility study and the approval
of the archivist, public officers may operate their
own microfilm services, contract with a private
vendor, contract with the U t a h Correctional Industries, or contract with t h e archives to borrow
a portable camera to do t h e source document microfilming. Those participating in these options
must comply with t h e standards prescribed in
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Section 63-2-70. Processing and developing of microfilm shall be provided by archives unless otherwise justified a n d approved by the archivist.
Microfilm services may also be provided to local
government agencies a n d reasonable charges
made for these services. Where a n agency elects
to operate based on a feasibility study done by
t h e archivist, t h e agency's microfilm processing
lab and quality assurance work must be done in
accordance with Section 63-2-70. T h e agency
m u s t give t h e archives daily sensimeter and
sensometric reading a s to film quality.
(7) establish a forms management program.
(8) establish a reports and directives managem e n t program.
(9) establish a vital records management program.
1985
63-2-77. R e c o r d s - m a n a g e m e n t program — Duties of state agencies.
The head of each state agency shall:
(1) establish a n d maintain a n active, continuing program for t h e economical and efficient
m a n a g e m e n t of t h e records of t h e agency;
(2) appoint a records officer to work with archives in the care, maintenance, scheduling, disposal, and preservation of agency records;
(3) m a k e and maintain records containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures,
and essential transactions of the agency designed
to furnish information to protect t h e legal and
financial rights of t h e state and of persons directly affected by t h e agency's activities;
(4) submit to t h e archivist, in accordance with
procedures established by the archivist, schedules proposing t h e length of time each state
record series w a r r a n t s retention for administrative, legal, or fiscal purposes after it has been
created or received by the agency;
(5) cooperate with t h e archivist in the conduct
of surveys made by t h e archivist under this act;
(6) give notice to the archivist, in accordance
with procedures established by t h e archivist, of
classifications determined by t h e agency for all
record series a n d automated systems containing
personal data on individuals;
(7) comply with t h e rules and procedures issued by the archivist.
1985
63-2-78. Other g o v e r n i n g b o d i e s t o promote
principles of efficient records management — Archivist to assist with local
programs.
The governing body of each county, city, town, district, authority, or any public corporation, or political
entity whether organized and existing under charter
OT undeT general l a w shall promote t h e principles of
efficient records m a n a g e m e n t for its records. The governing body shall follow t h e program established for
t h e management of records by state agencies. T h e
archivist shall, upon t h e request of a local governing
body, provide advice and assistance in t h e establishm e n t of a local records management program and
shall provide services similar to those available to the
executive branch of state government under this act.
1985

63-2-79. Records management — Archivist to
assist legislative and judicial branches
if requested.
Upon request, the archivist shall assist and advise
the establishment of records-management programs
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in the legislative and judicial branches of state government and shall, as required by them, provide program services similar to those available to the executive branch of state government pursuant to the provisions of this act.
1969
63-2-80.

Purchases of filing and microfilm
equipment — Approval and standards.
All purchases of microfilm equipment by state
agencies must be approved by the archivist. The archivist shall issue standards for the purchase of all
microfilm equipment and supplies by political subdivisions to ensure compatibility of that equipment
with state equipment and record keeping practices.
1985

63-2-81 to 63-2-83.

Repealed.

1985

63-2-84. Charges for state publications.
The executive director of administrative services
shall determine the charge, if any, for the purchase of
any state publications under control of the state archivist and shall remit daily to the state treasurer all
moneys received from the sale of such publications.
1981

63-2-85.

Repealed.

1965

63-2-85.1.

Identification of authorities collecting
or using data.
The archivist is directed to identify responsible authorities in state government involved in the collection or use of data on individuals or summary data.
1979

63-2-85.2. Report on information practices —
Contents.
(1) On or before December 1 of each year, the archivist shall prepare a report or a revision of the previous year's report on information practices for presentation to the Legislature and to the governor.
Summaries of the report shall be available to the public at a nominal cost. The report shall contain information including, but not limited to:
(a) the name of each record series containing
public, confidential, and private data on individuals which are kept bj the state, a description of
the kinds of information contained in them, the
reason that the data is kept, the use made of the
data, the source of the data, the categories of individuals covered by the data, and the categories
of individuals who will have access to the data in
the exercise of their duties;
(b) the title, name, and address of the responsible authority for each system of public, confidential, or private data on individuals;
(c) the policies and practices of the responsible
authority and the secretary regarding data storage, duration of retention of data, disclosure, and
disposal of them;
(d) a description of the provisions for maintaining the integrity of the data under Subsection 63-2-85.3 (4);
(e) the procedures under Section 63-2-85.4
whereby an individual may:
(i) be informed if he is the subject of any
data on individuals in the system;
(ii) gain access to that data; and
(iii) contest the accuracy, completeness,
and pertinence of that data and necessity for
retaining it; and
(0 any recommendations concerning appropriate legislation.

63-2-85.4

(2) Each responsible authority shall furnish the archivist with the data set forth in Subsection (1) at a
time set by the archivist to enable preparation of t h a t
annual report.
1985
63-2-85.3. Rules.
The executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, with the recommendation of
the archivist shall promulgate rules in accordance
with Sections 63-46a-4 and 63-46a-12. These rules
shall apply only to state systems of data on individuals or summary data and shall provide for the implementation of the enforcement and administration of
the following standards:

(1) Collection of data on individuals and establishment of related files of the data in state government shall be limited to that necessary for the
administration and management of programs enacted by the Legislature or by executive order.
(2) Data on individuals shall be under the jurisdiction of the responsible authority identified
and designated by the archivist. The responsible
authority shall document and file with the archivist the nature of all data on individuals collected and stored and the need for, and intended
use of, the data and any other information required.
(3) The use of summary data under the jurisdiction of one or more responsible authorities
shall be permitted, subject to the requirement
that the data be summarized under the direction
of, and by, that responsible authority. Requests
for use of any data shall be in writing, stating the
intended use.
(4) Appropriate safeguards shall be established in relation to the collection, storage, exchange, dissemination, and use of data on individuals to assure that all data is accurate, complete, and current and that regard for the right of
privacy is afforded to the individual who is the
subject of the data. Emphasis shall be placed on
the data security requirements of computerized
files which are accessible directly by means of
telecommunication, including security during
transmission.
(5) Data on individuals shall be stored only so
long as necessary for the administration of authorized programs as authorized by statute or by
the State Records Committee.
(6) Safeguards shall be established to facilitate
access, during reasonable business hours, to public records of the state not otherwise exempt from
public disclosure under state and federal statutes, under administrative rules which implement them, under judicial decisions, and under
the classification authority contained in this act.
1987

63-2-85.4. Rights of individuals on whom data
stored — Data in dispute, procedure.
The rights of individuals on whom data is stored or
is to be stored and the responsibilities of each responsible authority in regard to that data are as follows:
(1) The purposes for which the data on individuals is collected and used, or is to be collected and
used, shall be filed in writing by the responsible
authority with the archivist and shall be a matter of public record.
(2) An individual requested to supply confidential or private data shall be informed of the
intended uses of that data.
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(3) Any individual refusing to supply confidential or private data shall be informed by the requesting party of any known consequence arising
from that refusal.
(4) No confidential or private data shall be
used other than for the stated purposes nor shall
it be disclosed to any person other than the individual to whom the data pertains, without express consent of that individual, except that next
of kin may obtain information needed to acquire
benefits due a deceased person.
(5) Upon request to the responsible authority,
an individual shall be informed whether he is the
subject of any data on individuals, informed of
the content and meaning of that data, and shown
the data without any charge. The responsible authority shall charge an appropriate fee for any
additional requests within a six-month period
unless the requested information is in dispute.
(6) An individual shall have the right to contest the accuracy or completeness of any data on
individuals which concerns that individual. If
that data is contested, the individual shall notify,
in writing, the responsible authority of the nature of the disagreement. Within 30 days from
that notice, the responsible authority shall either
correct the data if it is found to be inaccurate or
incomplete and notify past recipients of the inaccurate or incomplete data of the change, or shall
notify the individual of his disagreement with
the statement of contest. Any person aggrieved
by the determination of that responsible authority may appeal that determination to the State
Records Committee and, if still dissatisfied, may
bring appropriate
action
under
Section
63-46a-13. Data in dispute shall not be disclosed
except under conditions required by law or rule
and only if the individual's statement of disagreement is included with the disclosed data.
1987

63-2-86. Rules.
The archivist, with the approval of the director of
the Department of Administrative Services, shall
promulgate rules to implement this act.
1985
63-2-87. Violation of act a misdemeanor.
(1) Any person who violates any provision of this
act is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) Any public employee who willfully violates any
provision of this act or the rules promulgated under
the act is subject to suspension without pay or discharge after a hearing as provided by law.
1985
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63-2-89. E x e m p t i o n s from a c t
This act does not apply to data on individuals relating to criminal investigations or records more than
75 years old.
IMS
63-2-90,63-2-91.

Repealed.

itti

CHAPTER 3
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICITY AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
(Repealed by Laws 1953, ch. 123, I 15.)
63-3-1 to 63-3-17.

Repealed.
CHAPTER 4

CONSERVATION AND RESEARCH
FOUNDATION
Section
63-4-1.
63-4-2.

63-4-3.
63-4-4.

63-4-5.
63-4-6.
63-4-7.
63-4-8.

Creation.
Membership — Expenses — Records —
Bonds of officers — State to hold prior
lien on assets.
Name — State agency.
Appropriation for treatment of Utah coals
— Profits conveyed to state — Governor
and auditor members of board.
State agencies to provide facilities for assistance.
Foundation as state agency empowered to
receive grants of funds.
"Nonprofit" defined.
Information secret — Used exclusively for
benefit of state — Exceptions.

63-4-1. Creation.
That a scientific, nonpolitical, nonprofit foundation
or corporation shall be made an agency of the state of
Utah for carrying out scientific research and practical
demonstration of processes and methods for the conservation and efficient utilization of the natural resources of the state of Utah and state funds shall be
granted for such purposes.
1953
63-4-2.

Membership — Expenses — Records —
B o n d s o f officers — State to hold prior
lien on assets.
(1) That such foundation or corporation shall be
composed only of citizens of the state of Utah.
(2) That such foundation or corporation shall be
organized under the laws of the state of Utah.
63-2-88. Violation of act — Liability for dam(3) That such foundation or corporation shall be
ages — Injunction.
organized as a scientific, nonpolitical, nonprofit re(1) Any responsible authority who violates any
search and conservation organization open to all citiprovision of this act shall be liable to any person,
zens making affirmation that their object in joining is
suffering damage as a result thereof, and the person
and will continue to be, while they remain members
damaged may bring an action against the state to
thereof, the conservation and most efficient utilizarecover any damages sustained, plus costs incurred
tion of the natural resources of the state for the equal
and reasonable attorney fees.
welfare and benefit of all the citizens of the state.
(2) Any responsible authority who willfully vio(4) No officer or trustee of said foundation shall
lates any provision of this act shall, in addition to receive any salary or remuneration for services as
those remedies provided under Subsection (1), be lia- such officer or trustee other than necessary expenses
ble for exemplary damages of not less than $100 nor incurred in carrying out their duties as officers, such
more than $1,000 for each violation.
expenditures to be approved by the Division of Fi(3) Any responsible authority which violates or
nance.
proposes to violate the provisions of this act may be
(5) An exact and complete record of all expendienjoined by any district court in this state. The court
tures of funds appropriated by the state shall be kept
may make any order or judgment as may be necesand reported to the Division of Finance for each quarsary to prevent the use or employment by any person terly period, and that the books and records of the
of such violations of this act.
1979 corporation shall be subject to an audit by the state

